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Abstract 
 
 
In the last 20 years, developed countries have struggled with what seemed to be an 
ever rising tide of asylum seekers, a trend that has now gone into reverse. This paper 
examines what happened and why. How have oppression, violence and economic 
conditions in origin countries shaped worldwide trends in asylum applications? And 
has the toughening of policy towards asylum seekers since 2001 reduced the 
numbers? What policies have been effective and which host countries have been most 
affected? This paper surveys the trends in asylum seeking since the 1980s and the 
literature that it has generated and it provides new regression estimates of the 
determinants of asylum applications up to the present. The key findings are first, that 
violence and terror can account for much of the variation across source countries and 
over time but it cannot fully explain the original surge in asylum applications during 
the 1980s. And second, while tougher policies did have a deterrent effect, they 
account for only about a third of the decline in applications since 2001.  
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Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades developed countries have struggled with what seemed to be 
an ever rising tide of asylum seekers, a trend that has now gone into reverse. The 
number of asylum claims lodged in developed countries rose from less than 200,000 
per annum in the early 1980s to a peak of 850,000 in 1992. After some decline the 
numbers reached a second peak of 600,000 in 2001. Since that time the number has 
halved, representing a return to figures last seen in the 1980s. This paper seeks to 
understand the ebb and flow of asylum applications in terms of conditions in source 
countries including politics, war and terror, as well as conditions in destination 
countries. It focuses especially on the asylum policies that have been implemented 
across the developed world as governments have attempted to reduce the numbers. 
 The surge of asylum applications that took place in the 1980s led eventually to 
a sharp policy backlash, particularly in countries among the EU-15 that bore the brunt 
of the steep rise in asylum applications. The overwhelming majority of applications 
was made by individuals or small groups who arrived independently in the country of 
asylum, often illegally, and who then claimed the right to refugee status under the 
1951 Refugee Convention. They were often portrayed in the popular press as 
economic migrants and bogus refugees. Governments responded to the clamour for 
action by tightening access to the country’s territory, toughening the procedures to 
determine refugee status and making the living conditions for asylum applicants less 
palatable. During the 1990s these policies seemed to have only modest effects in 
bringing the numbers down and governments were urged to redouble their efforts to 
reduce the numbers to ‘acceptable’ levels. 
 Since 2001 policy in many countries has become even tougher and asylum 
applications have fallen dramatically. Not surprisingly governments have been quick 
to claim that changes in legislation and procedural purges have been much more 
successful than in the past. For example in February 2003 Prime Minister Tony Blair 
committed the government to a drastic cut in the numbers. Speaking at the Labour 
Party conference in September that year he announced that: “We have cut asylum 
applications by half. But we must go further. We should cut back the ludicrously 
complicated appeal process, de-rail the gravy train of legal aid, fast track those from 
democratic countries, and remove those who fail in their claims without further 
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judicial interference.”1 Three years later in November 2006 the UK Immigration 
Minister Liam Byrne commented that “Asylum applications for the year to date are at 
their lowest level since 1993 and we intend to build on this progress. We have seen in 
the year so far more failed asylum seekers being removed than predicted unfounded 
asylum claims, but there is more still do.”2 
 Refugee advocates often argue that trends in asylum seeking are essentially 
driven by war and human rights abuses in places such as Rwanda, Kosovo, Darfur, 
and many others where the sources of persecution are all too obvious. They typically 
deplore the clampdown on asylum seekers, arguing that governments are depriving 
genuine refugees of the sanctuary to which they are entitled without having much 
effect on the number that apply.3 So, should tougher policy take the credit (if credit 
there is)? Or are trends in asylum applications mostly due to changes in the intensity 
of war, conflict and other conditions in origin countries that ultimately drive refugee 
flight?  
The following sections provide an analysis of what happened and why. The 
next section gives a broad overview of trends in asylum applications and in the stock 
of refugees across countries of origin and destination and over time. This is followed 
by an analysis of the source country causes of asylum-seeker flights. I then turn to an 
outline of policy developments in the last decade and derive a new index of policy 
stance in the main destination countries. The following section reviews existing 
analyses of the deterrent effects of policy and provides new estimates for the decade 
1997-2006. The findings overall are summed up in a short conclusion. 
 
                                                 
1 The full text of the speech was reported in The Guardian, Tuesday September 30th 2003.  
2 Comments on the asylum statistics for the third quarter of 2006, reported on the Home Office website 
at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/news/asylum-stats-quarterly-1106. The statement refers to 
the official target for removals (see further below).   
3 For example, in response to the publication of figures showing a decline in applications in August 
2003 the UK Refugee Council argued that: “Tougher restrictions on entry to the UK are denying 
protection to those who need it most and, contrary to the governments claim today, are unlikely to be a 
sustainable method of reducing numbers of asylum applications in the long run. .. Building further 
barriers to the UK, and penalising those who enter clandestinely, threatens to punish those who most 
need our protection.” (http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/news/press/2003/august/20030828figur.htm).  
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Trends in Asylum seeking 
 
Long run trends 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) collects 
extensive data on applications for asylum in the ‘industrialized countries’ of Europe 
North America and Australasia.4 These are first instance claims and they are almost 
always submitted within or at the border of the destination country. They are lodged 
by applicants who have arrived spontaneously from their country of origin rather than 
under the resettlement programmes of the UNHCR or other non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). Figure 1a shows the time profile of total applications and its 
distribution across receiving regions. Over the whole period since 1980, 68 percent of 
applications were submitted in the countries of the EU-15 while 10 percent were 
lodged in other European countries and 20 percent were lodged in North America. 
The figure shows that the two surges mentioned earlier, that peaked in 1992 and 2001, 
were largely the result of variations in applications to the EU-15, which also accounts 
for much of the decline after 2001. The trend growth in the numbers seeking asylum 
in other European countries is largely accounted for by the newer EU member states.  
Figure 1b shows the overall profile of asylum applications by region of origin. 
Over the whole period since 1980, 37 percent of applications came from Asia, 17 
percent came from Africa and 10 percent from Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Europe accounted for 28 percent and these originated almost entirely from Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. The sharp spike in total applications in 1992 was 
largely the product of events that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. Also underlying the profile are milder humps in applications 
from Africa and Asia, one in 1990-3 and the other a decade later. The graph shows 
that the decline in applications since 2001 has been common to all regions of origin 
although it is most marked for Asia. 
Figure 2 illustrates the time profile of asylum applications for five individual 
source countries, plotted on a log scale. Applications from Serbia and Montenegro 
follow a steep rise during the 1980s followed by the peaks associated with the 
Bosnian war of 1992-3 and the 1998-9 conflict in Kosovo. Similarly the profile for 
Iraq shows a rise during first Gulf War of 1990-1 as well as a sustained flow leading 
                                                 
4 The 37 ‘industrialized’ countries include the EU-27 plus Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Australia, New Zealand, United States, Canada, Japan and Korea.   
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up to the invasion of 2003. For Afghanistan, there is a sharp rise following the end of 
the Soviet occupation with a further increase leading up to the war against the 
Taliban. There are also peaks in the early 1990s for Lebanon, associated with Syrian 
intervention and for Ethiopia during the conflict over the secession of Eritrea. It is 
worth noting that while peaks occur around major conflicts, asylum applications often 
rise in advance of outright war and persist well after the end of the conflict.    
Only a small proportion of those who are displaced become asylum seekers in 
Western countries and fewer still are accepted as genuine refugees. The applications 
to industrialised countries in Figure 1 are on average less than 5 percent of the refugee 
stock. Most of those who are counted as refugees by the UNHCR are displaced into 
neigbouring countries and often into the poverty and squalor of refugee camps near 
the border. The population ‘of concern’ to the UNHCR also includes those displaced 
within their own country, who are not formally defined as refugees. These numbered 
around five million in 1997-2003 and the total rose steeply to 12.8 million in 2006, 
although this is largely due to more complete enumeration. 5  
Figure 3 plots the UNHCR’s estimates of the total stock of refugees by the 
continent in which they are located. That number climbed steeply from around four 
million in the late 1970s to a peak of 18 million in 1992, after which there is a steep 
decline to under ten million in 2006.  The profile over time of the refugee stock 
strongly resembles that of asylum applications in Figures 1a and 1b, which suggests 
that the asylum numbers bear the imprint of the humantarian tragedies in the source 
regions. It therefore seems likely that events in the origin countries of Africa, Asia 
and Eastern Europe have been key determinants of the long run trends in asylum 
applications. 
 
Trends in destination countries 
Are the trends in asylum applications common to most receiving countries?  
Table 1 shows average annual applications for 19 leading destination countries in the 
five year periods from 1987-1991 to 2002-06. Together they account for 95 percent of 
all the applications received by industrialised countries over the two decades. Among 
these countries, the the largest number of applications was received by Germany with 
27 percent of the 19-country total. This is followed by the US with 14 percent, the UK 
                                                 
5 For discussions of the issues surrounding the counting of refugees, see Crisp (1999) and Schmeidl 
(2000).  
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with 10 percent and France with 8 percent.  The most striking feature of the table is 
the differences in the trends across countries, even between neighbouring countries  
Thus Austria and Germany, both until recently on the EU’s Eastern border, show very 
different patterns. In Austria the numbers fell from 1987-91 to 1992-6 but rose in each 
subsequent quinquenium, whereas in Germany the pattern was exactly the opposite. In 
the UK the numbers increased until 1997-2001 and then fell whereas in France the 
number fell to 1992-6 and rose thereafter. In the 1990s there was a surge in asylum 
applications to relatively new destinations such as Ireland and Italy as well as to 
countries that would later join the EU: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.  
Of particular relevance to what follows later are the diverse trends in 
applications over the last two quinquenia. As shown in the last column of the table, 
between 1997-01 and 2001-6 total applications in these countries declined by 25 
percent. Against this benchmark the fall of 31 percent for the UK hardly seems 
dramatic. But there is wide variation in the trends for other countries. Applications fell 
by more than 60 percent in Australia, Denmark, Hungary and the Netherlands while 
they increased by more than 50 percent in France, Poland and Sweden and by nearly 
50 percent in Austria. This diversity in trends could be the result of the country’s 
specific location, the source country composition of its applicants, or of changes in 
labour market conditions. But it could also be the result of differences in asylum 
policies—something that will be investigated further below.  
 
The outcomes for asylum seekers.  
The most important outcome for asylum seekers is whether their application is 
accepted or not. Figure 4 shows the three possible outcomes of refugee status 
determination procedure for industrialised countries as a whole. These are first 
instance decisions and so they exclude appeals and they also exclude cases in which 
the application was withdrawn or lapsed. Over the period from 1982 to 2006 the 
proportion of decisions that resulted in recognition under definition of the 1951 
Refugee Convention was 18 percent. A further 10 percent, while not qualifying as 
Convention refugees, were allowed to stay on humanitarian grounds. The total 
recognition rate (Convention plus humanitarian, as a share of all decisions) fell from 
over 50 percent in 1982 to less than 20 percent in 1990 before rising again. In recent 
years it has fallen from 32 percent in 2001 to 23 percent in 2004 before recovering 
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again in 2005-6. Even accounting for those that were successful on appeal (about 5 
percent of all cases), some two thirds of all asylum claims end with rejection.   
 The evidence on the subsequent histories of asylum seekers is sketchy. Most 
of those whose asylum claims have failed are required to leave the country.  Some are 
repatriated voluntarily, with or without official assistance, and an increasing number 
are forcibly deported. In the UK removals and voluntary departures increased as a 
percentage of the number of claims rejected from less than 20 percent in 1997-2001 to 
just over a third in 2002-6 (UK Home Office, 2007a, p. 30). The proportion removed 
has risen steeply in the last few years and the Home Office reached its target of 
removals equalling the number of ‘unfounded’ cases for the first time in 2006.6  It is 
hard to escape the conclusion that in earlier years a large proportion of failed asylum 
seekers simply stayed illegally.7 The pattern in other EU countries has been similar 
with increased numbers of failed asylum seekers being detained prior to deportation 
but a substantial residue remaining illegally.8  
 A few studies have explored the subsequent histories of those who have been 
granted some form of asylum. Evidence for Canada indicates that those in 
employment earned about the same as immigrants entering through the family 
reunification stream (De Voretz et al. 2004).  But even after seven years their 
employment rates were lower and their welfare dependency rates were twice as high 
as the family migrants. Those counted as refugees in the Netherlands have low levels 
of education relative to other immigrants and only about one third had obtained 
employment after five years (Hartog and Zorlu, 2008). In the UK, refugees’ 
employment rates were only half the average for ethnic minorities as a whole despite 
their having comparable education levels (Bloch, 2002). These studies also suggest 
that those with further education and training gained little economic advantage from 
                                                 
6 This target is alluded to in the statement by Liam Byrne, quoted above. It is based on comparing the 
number of unsuccessful asylum seekers removed (voluntarily or involuntarily) with the number of new 
applications that are predicted to fail (including appeals). For 2004, the earliest figure to be reported, 
the ratio of the former to the latter was less than 50 percent.  
7 There are no firm estimates of the numbers. For the UK the National Audit Office (2005, p. 13) 
estimated that between 1997 and 2004 the number of rejected applicants who were not known to have 
left the country, either voluntarily or forcibly, was between 155,000 and 283,500. Assuming that 
roughly a third of these would have left implies that the number remaining would be somewhere 
between 100 and 200 thousand (probably around a fifth to two-fifths of the illegal population).  
8 Policies and practices in a range of countries as of 2006 are detailed in the appendices to Field (2006). 
In 2005 the Dutch Immigration Service identified 26,000 applicants whose claims had been rejected 
prior to 2001 but who were still present. 41 percent of these were given residence permits, but of the 
remainder, 61 percent absconded to avoid being removed (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 
2005, p. 226, at:  http://www.ecre.org/resources/publications/689 ).  
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it, often because of lack of fluency in the host country language. Many were on the 
margins of employment, with temporary or part-time jobs. One implication is that the 
outcomes for refugees are particularly sensitive to aggregate labour market conditions, 
particularly in the few years after arrival (Valtonen, 1999).  
 By its very nature there is little evidence on outcomes for failed asylum 
seekers who remain in the country illegally. It seems likely that their outcomes are 
inferior to those with some form of legal status. Nevertheless they are probably better 
off than they would be in the origin country.  
 
Politics, Oppression and Violence in Source Countries 
 
Most observers would agree that wars and violence, political oppression and human 
rights abuses of various sorts lie at the root of refugee flights. Less obvious is which 
particular forces matter most and whether other social and economic factors also play 
a role. As the UNHCR puts it, “Many people leave their home for a combination of 
political, economic and other reasons” (UNHCR, 2001, p. 156). This is especially the 
case when we consider those who turn up as asylum seekers in Europe and North 
America rather than remaining stranded in their first port of call. Still less clear is 
whether, and how far, war, oppression and political upheaval can account for the 
long-term rise and the subsequent decline in asylum applications to industrialised 
countries.  
 
Previous research 
There is a vast quantity of research that reports and analyses the situations that 
generate refugee flights in particular countries or regions. Much of it is descriptive 
and is often produced by, or on behalf of, organisations like the UNHCR or the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM), not to mention various advocacy 
groups and NGOs. There is also an academic literature that analyses more formally 
the causes of refugee flights.9 One focus of debate is the distinction between the 
proximate causes of refugee exodus, such as violence and terror, and the deeper 
structural conditions that give rise to these situations, such as political authority, 
ethnic fractionalisation, poverty, inequality and resource endowments. Such variables 
                                                 
9 Comprehensive accounts of causes and consequences of refugee flights include Zolberg et al. (1989), 
Weiner (1997) and Marfleet (2006).  
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are sometimes seen as working through an exit-voice trade-off: whether to leave or to 
fight; whether to resist or just lie low in the hope that a better future will emerge. 
Another line of research focuses on the obstacles that intervene between the latent 
desire to escape the origin country and the ability to do so. Some of the relevant 
factors may cut in both directions. For instance, people may want to escape an 
authoritarian regime but find that repressive policies make it hard to do so. Similarly, 
poverty may intensify the desire to flee but at the same time reduce the ability to do 
so.     
In one of the more influential papers Schmeidl (1997) used regression analysis 
to explain variations in the stock of refugees in over 100 countries in the 1970s and 
1980s. She found that the most significant variables were those representing armed 
conflict, especially civil wars and genocide or politicide. In the presence of these 
forces, other variables representing political rights, civil liberties and ethnic tensions 
were generally not significant. Intervening factors (poverty, population density, 
geography) also proved to be unimportant unless they were interacted with some 
measure of conflict. But those interactions seem not to work in the ‘right’ direction 
and Schmeidl (1997, p. 304) surmised that intervening conditions may be less 
important than some of the previous literature suggested. Further research has largely 
confirmed those results. Davenport et al. (2003) and Moore and Shellman (2005) 
provide fixed effects estimates for the net refugee stock, including the internally 
displaced, for over 100 countries. Both studies found that conflict, genocide and 
protest were the most influential variables as well as finding some role for transitions 
towards democracy.  
These studies focus on the (absolute) stock of refugees rather than on the flow 
of asylum seekers to the developed world. By contrast, Neumayer (2005) analysed 
asylum applications to Western Europe by country of origin. The results indicate that 
asylum flows are largely explained by the same variables that generate total refugee 
displacements.  Like Moore and Shellman (2005) he found that an index of political 
terror was highly significant, and in addition that autocracy had a positive effect on 
asylum flows. He also found negative effects for the level and change in origin 
country GDP per capita, while the share of prime age population and the cumulative 
stock of past applicants were positive influences. A comparison of the results suggests 
that some variables such as genocides, famines and natural disasters mainly generate 
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internal and cross-border displacements rather than longer-distance flights.10 On the 
other hand economic and demographic factors seem to be more important for longer-
distance migrations. 
 
Trends in Politics and Oppression 
While previous studies have used panel data to explain refugee stocks and 
asylum flows, none of them have seriously considered how (or even whether) changes 
in the incidence of oppression and the evolution of political structures explain the 
long-run trends. Table 2 reports, by five-year periods, eight key indicators that will 
later be used in regression analysis. These are unweighted averages for 48 countries 
that generated significant numbers of asylum seekers at some time over the period 
from 1982 to 2006. For the periods from 1992-6 onwards, the figures in parentheses 
cover an expanded list of 56 countries, which includes some of the successor states to 
the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The countries and the data 
sources are listed in Appendix 1.  
The first row reports a measure of democracy derived from Polity IV database 
on political regime characteristics and transitions. This is a composite index of 
authoritarianism ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic), 
and it indicates a strong trend towards democracy over the period. The average for 
these countries shifted from moderately autocratic in 1982-6 to mildly democratic in 
2002-6. The Freedom House indices of political rights and civil liberties are reported 
in rows (2) and (3). These indices range from one to seven, and have been re-ordered 
so that higher numbers reflect greater freedom. Both political rights and civil liberties 
improved secularly over the period, a trend that according to previous studies should 
have been reducing the number of asylum applications. 
The next two variables represent direct threats to safety rather than 
institutional characteristics that create the conditions for repression. The first of these 
(row 4) is a measure of the scale and intensity of civil wars, as represented by the 
number of battle-related deaths per thousand of the population. Civil war is the most 
common form of armed conflict and is typically fought on the country’s own territory. 
Paradoxically, this measure of conflict declines dramatically between 1982-6 and 
1992-6, just at the time when the number of asylum applications was steeply 
                                                 
10 However, Moore and Shellman (2006) find that civil war and high levels of dissident violence and 
government terror raises increases the number of refugees relative to the number internally displaced.  
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increasing. Row (5) shows the averages for the political terror scale, which ranges 
from 1 to 5 (maximum terror). This is based on reports by the US State Department on 
the extent of brutality, torture and arbitrary imprisonment.11 In contrast to the trend in 
war deaths, this index shows a modest rise to the early 1990s followed by a slight 
decline.  
Row (6) reports the trend in GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables in 
thousands of US dollars at 2000 prices. This shows little increase until the last decade. 
As noted earlier, higher average income could make asylum migration more feasible 
but less desirable. If the latter effect dominates, this might help explain some of the 
recent decline in asylum applications although it will not account for the earlier 
upward trend. Row (7) of the table shows the trend increase in population, which by 
increasing the numbers at risk must have imparted a long run upward trend to the 
absolute number of asylum seekers. And finally, the share of population in the 
migration-intensive age group 20-39 (row 8) increased slightly, which could have had 
an additional positive effect.12  
 
New estimates of asylum flows by source country. 
How well do the variables listed above explain variations in the number of 
asylum seekers across countries and over time? For this analysis I use UNHCR data 
for first instance applications made in industrialised countries, which as noted earlier, 
accounts for only a fraction of all refugee flights.13 The regressions in Table 3 take as 
the dependent variable the log of asylum applications per thousand of the source 
country population for each five-year period, using 48 countries for 1982-86 and 
1987-91 and 56 countries for the later periods.1415 Restricting the sample to 48 
countries throughout makes very little difference to the results. The civil rights 
                                                 
11 The alternative version of the terror scale, which is based on reports by Amnesty International, gives 
very similar results.   
12 Migration models often include some measure of the age structure of the origin country population 
on the grounds that the present value of migration is higher at younger ages (see Hatton and 
Williamson, 2005).  
13 The UNHCR’s Statistical Online Population Database now provides comprehensive statistics on 
asylum applications by country of origin and destination. The UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, published 
annually since 2001 reports applications by origin country but only for the most important sources in 
each period.  
14 This is calculated as the (natural) log of the average of asylum claims per thousand over the period 
rather than the average of the log for each year. The log form is used because the variable is bounded at 
zero; hence the effects of the explanatory variables diminish as the asylum seeker rate approaches zero. 
15 Although the sample is selected to include the countries that are major sources of asylum seekers, 
selection bias is mitigated by the inclusion in the regressions of source country random or fixed effects.  
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variable was never significant (it is highly correlated with the political rights variable) 
and so this was dropped. Similarly the share of population aged 20-39 was never 
significant and it too was dropped.   
The regressions in the first two columns of Table 3 are estimated with country-
level random effects while the third and fourth columns use fixed effects.   In these 
regressions, per capita income is always negative and significant, indicating that 
poorer countries generate more asylum seekers and confirming the UNHCR’s view 
that economic motives are relevant in refugee flights. GDP per capita is measured in 
thousands of US dollars (at constant 2000 prices) and so an increase of a thousand 
dollars in a country’s income increases its asylum applications by about 15 percent 
(col. 1). This is roughly the income difference between Mali and Somalia, or between 
Serbia and Angola.    
In the first two columns the democracy variable is positive. At first sight this 
suggests that it is harder to escape from autocratic regimes. However, this variable is 
highly correlated with the Freedom House index of political rights (the correlation 
coefficient is 0.84), and when the latter is excluded the coefficient on democracy 
becomes negative and insignificant. The index of political rights itself has a strong 
negative effect suggesting that this measure captures an important element of the 
political oppression that creates asylum seekers. Not surprisingly, war has a large 
positive effect. An increase of one battle-related death per thousand of the population 
raises increases asylum applications by nearly a half.  
One other large effect in the first two columns is the dummy for Europe (other 
continental dummies were insignificant). Countries in Eastern Europe generate a level 
of asylum applications on the order of three times that of other countries, all else 
constant. This is likely because of their proximity to the EU, and one might expect it 
to be larger from the late 1980s onwards, especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
But a dummy for Europe from 1987 onwards was not significant, either alone or in 
combination with a dummy for 2002 onwards for countries that joined the EU in 
2004. 
In the second and third columns the political terror scale is added to the 
explanatory variables and its presence weakens the coefficients on democracy and 
political rights as well as the effect of war, which is reduced to zero in the fixed 
effects specification. Here the random effects specification (col. 2) is rejected against 
fixed effects (col. 3). Not surprisingly, a direct measure of terror is more powerful 
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predictor of asylum flows than variables that reflect institutions. Its presence also 
reduces the effect of war, probably because terror captures some of the threats to 
civilians that are only indirectly measured by military casualties. The effect is very 
large: going up one level on the terror scale increases asylum applications on the order 
of two thirds (col. 3).  In all these specifications there is a very large period effect for 
1982-6 relative to the reference period 1997-2002, which seems to be common across 
all regions. Thus the great surge in asylum applications from the early 1980s to the 
late 1980s is not explained by the other variables in the model.  
The effects across periods can be assessed using the parsimonious 
specification in column (4). Taking a constant set of 48 countries, the trend in per 
capita income increased asylum applications on average between 1982-6 and 1992-6 
by about 9 percent. Over the same period deterioration in political rights also 
increased average applications by 9 percent while the rise in political terror boosted 
average applications by 25 percent. By contrast, between 1992-6 and 2002-6 these 
variables were pushing in the opposite direction. The growth in GDP per capita 
reduced applications by 20 percent and the improvement in political rights reduced 
applications by 8 percent while the modest decline in political terror reduced them by 
15 percent. 
It is hard to account fully for the rise in asylum applications during the 1980s. 
Although terror was on the rise, the number of asylum applications increased by far 
more than can be accounted for by this variable alone, and it seems to have been 
pervasive across all source regions. A number of causes have been suggested, 
including better access to developed countries after the collapse of communism, the 
growth in the scope and efficiency of people smuggling networks, and the information 
and assistance provided by previous asylum seekers (Hatton, 2004). So far these 
hypotheses have largely eluded measurement. But the picture since the early 1990s is 
a little different. Between 1992-6 and 2002-6, the asylum fundamentals were tending 
to depress the numbers and, although the period dummies are not significant, there is 
weak evidence of a further decline of about 20 percent between 1997-2001 and 2002-
6. Whether policy played some role in that decline will be investigated further below.   
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Asylum Policies in the Developed World 
 
The international framework for asylum policy is the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Article 1 of the Convention provides the 
definition of a refugee as someone who is outside his or her country of habitual 
residence and who is unable or unwilling to return to it owing to a ‘well founded fear 
of persecution’. Article 33, the so-called non-refoulement clause, provides that a 
person cannot be forcibly returned to a territory where he or she may be at risk of 
persecution. All developed countries (and most others) are signatories to the 
Convention. Any credible application for asylum submitted in a signatory state must 
be considered under the terms of the Convention whether the applicant entered the 
country illegally or not. On the face of it, the Convention provides a guarantee of 
sanctuary for refugees who have gained access to the country’s territory without any 
limit to the number. 
 In practice there are many ways that governments can limit the number to 
whom they grant refuge. By allowing access only to applicants who are on the 
country’s territory and by tightening controls at the border through visa requirements, 
enhanced security checks and other measures to prevent illegal entry, a country can 
effectively restrict access to its asylum procedures. Secondly, the definition of a 
refugee is subject to differences of interpretation, with some countries taking a 
tougher line than others on exactly what constitutes a ‘well founded fear of 
persecution’. Although the grounds for Convention status are often restricted, most 
countries provide a form of subsidiary protection for applicants who, by virtue of the 
non-refoulement clause, cannot be returned to their country of origin. Subsidiary 
protection is often less advantageous to the refugee, and it sometimes provides for 
only temporary residence until conditions in the origin country improve. Finally, there 
is a variety of ways in which the conditions for asylum seekers can be made less (or 
more) attractive, including access to benefit and employment during the refugee status 
determination process and the extent to which the procedures provide opportunities 
for asylum seekers to melt away into the illegal sector.  
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Asylum policy to 199716 
Until the sharp worldwide rise in asylum applications in the 1980s, policy 
activism was limited. But as the numbers climbed, asylum shifted rapidly up the 
political agenda. This was most marked in the countries of the EU-15, which bore the 
brunt of the increase, particularly with the political and economic collapse in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union.  In the late 1980s a number of countries began to 
tighten external border controls and some, such as the UK in 1987, introduced 
sanctions against carriers of illegal immigrants. Several countries led by France 
introduced special airport zones, where asylum seekers could be held for pre-
screening and possible deportation.  Visa restrictions were progressively tightened—a 
trend that gained impetus with the relaxation of internal border controls under the 
Schengen Convention of 1990 (finally implemented in 1995). By 1998 the Schengen 
countries had a harmonised list of more than 150 non-EU countries for which visas 
were required.  
 In the early 1990s EU countries embarked on a series of measures that were 
foreshadowed by the 1990 Dublin Convention and a set of resolutions that emerged 
from a 1992 ministerial meeting in London. In Dublin it was agreed that asylum 
applications would be dealt with by one state, normally the state of first entry, in order 
to prevent ‘asylum shopping’. The London resolutions covered three further issues. 
The first was the ‘safe third country’ concept—the rule that an asylum claim could be 
summarily rejected if the applicant had transited through a country that was deemed 
safe and where he or she could have applied for asylum. The second was the ‘safe 
country of origin’ concept—the designation of source countries where there is a 
presumption of no risk of persecution. The third was the concept of ‘manifestly 
unfounded’ asylum applications, for which an expedited refugee status determination 
procedure could be used. Manifestly unfounded claims often included those that fell 
into the safe country of origin or safe third country categories as well as cases 
involving forged papers or evidence of criminal activity.  
 These policies did not become binding until 1997 and the timing of their 
introduction in different member states depended on the political response to rising 
applications and on legislative constraints. For example, in Germany, implementing 
such measures required a change to the Basic Law (constitution), which included a 
                                                 
16 For more detailed accounts of asylum policy and its development in the 1990s, see Gibney and 
Hansen (2005), Hatton (2004, 2005), Schuster (2000).  
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clause on the right to asylum and which was amended by new legislation in 1993. 
Recommendations by the European Council of Ministers on readmission agreements 
with source countries were also sporadically adopted. Both the timing and the 
substance of legislation varied across countries, as did the vigour with which the new 
rules were applied. Some countries speeded up the procedures by implementing fast- 
track processing and abbreviated appeals procedures.  Wide variations also remained 
in policies towards the granting of subsidiary protection status, over which there is 
more discretion. 
 During the 1990s European governments also implemented various 
restrictions on the conditions facing asylum seekers during the processing of their 
claims, such as dispersing them to locations outside the main cities and providing in- 
kind benefits accessible only at reception centres in place of standard welfare. A 
number of countries that, in the 1980s, had allowed asylum applicants to seek 
employment withdrew that right, such as France in 1991 and Belgium in 1993. Some 
countries also resorted to increasingly tough rules on the detention of those whose 
claims were likely to prove unfounded and introduced more effective deportation 
procedures for those not granted residence on any terms. Again, these policies and 
their effectiveness varied widely between countries.  
 
Asylum policies since 1997 
During the last decade there has been some harmonisation of asylum policies 
across the EU, stemming from the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, which moved asylum 
policy from the third pillar to the first pillar. This marked a shift towards centralised 
decision-making and gave the European Commission the right to propose legislation 
from 2002. The European Council meeting at Tampere (Finland) in 1999 reaffirmed 
that common EU policies would be based on a ‘full and inclusive’ application of the 
Refugee Convention, stressing that the principle of non-refoulement would be 
honoured. It planned the building of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in 
two stages (known as the Hague Programme). The first stage, up to 1st May 2004, was 
the harmonisation of certain key elements of asylum policy. The second stage, to be 
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completed by 2010, is a more fully integrated EU-wide asylum system providing a 
unified status for all those granted asylum.17 
 The first stage of the CEAS laid down minimum standards in several different 
areas. The Reception Conditions Directive laid down terms for access to employment 
and training, housing and subsistence, and health and education services for asylum 
seekers while their claims are being assessed. The so-called Dublin II Regulation 
embodied a new mechanism for determining the state responsible for an asylum 
claim, backed up with a common database for fingerprints. The Qualification 
Directive established a common set of criteria to be used in the refugee status 
determination procedure. And the Asylum Procedures Directive covers issues such as 
the designation of manifestly unfounded claims, and rights to interviews, to legal 
assistance and to appeals as well as common rules for granting subsidiary protection.18 
These rules, the impact of which differ across countries depending on their pre-
existing policy stance, are gradually being transposed into member state legislation. It 
should be noted however they do not cover every aspect of asylum policy and that 
they lay down only minimum standards. The first stage of the CEAS therefore falls far 
short of complete harmonisation.  
 Against the backdrop of EU legislation, member states introduced a range of 
legislative packages. The UK experience illustrates the step-by-step toughening of 
asylum rules. An Act of 1993 introduced a fast-track procedure for applicants from 
safe countries of origin and a 1996 Act introduced the safe third country concept. The 
1999 Immigration and Asylum Act established the National Asylum Support System 
under which asylum seekers were dispersed to centres outside London and vouchers 
were substituted for welfare benefits. The Act also speeded up the status 
determination process and tightened border security with increased powers of search 
and arrest for immigration officers and increased penalties for carriers of 
undocumented immigrants. This was followed by the 2002 Nationality, Immigration 
and Asylum Act, under which appeals no longer suspended deportation and 
permission to work after six months was abolished.  
                                                 
17 Details of policies, resolutions and legal instruments on asylum can be found on the European 
Commission website at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/asylum/doc_asylum_intro_en.htm.   
18 The regulations laid down in the first stage of the CEAS also include the Temporary Protection 
Directive and the Family Reunion Directive, although these are generally considered to be of lesser 
importance.  
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 Some countries responded to growing political pressure with major revisions 
to their asylum laws. In Denmark the Aliens Act of 1983 was amended in the mid-
1990s and again in 1998 and 2002. The 2002 amendments replaced the pre-existing 
de facto refugee status with a much narrower category, which did not carry the right 
to permanent residence, and also abolished the right to apply for asylum from outside 
the country. This and other reforms introduced a number of ‘motivational measures’ 
aimed at failed asylum seekers including detention without limit prior to removal. The 
Netherlands reacted to political pressure by introducing a range of new border 
controls in 1998. An Act of 2001 restricted the scope of subsidiary protection and 
limited the right to appeal. This was followed by a reorganisation of the 
administration of asylum applications under a new Ministry with a commitment to 
speeding up processing and enforcing deportation procedures.  
 Several countries in Eastern Europe that were previously sources of asylum 
seekers became recipients in the 1990s. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, all 
enacted legislation in the late 1990s to be consistent with EU standards. This involved 
setting up mechanisms for dealing with manifestly unfounded applications (not 
implemented in Poland until 2001), adopting safe country of origin and safe third 
country rules as well as establishing some form of subsidiary protection. In advance 
of accession to the EU, these countries also harmonised their visa regulations as well 
as strengthening their border security—in the case of Hungary with financial support 
from the EU.    
 Countries outside the EU also toughened their asylum policies. In 1999 
Australia introduced three-year Temporary Protection visas, with much reduced rights 
for ‘onshore’ asylum seekers.19 Then in August 2001, a Norwegian freighter, the MV 
Tampa, rescued 433 asylum seekers from a sinking vessel and requested to land them 
at Christmas Island. In a month-long standoff the Australian government refused 
permission to land the asylum seekers on Australian territory and eventually 
negotiated for them to be disembarked elsewhere, notably the Pacific island state of 
Nauru. In the wake of the blaze of publicity created by the Tampa affair, the 
Australian government passed six new bills into law. These included the excision of a 
number of islands from Australian territory for the purpose of establishing access to 
                                                 
19 Onshore asylum applications are those made by asylum seekers who arrive spontaneously rather than 
those resettled from locations near the source of oppression or conflict, who fall under the ‘offshore’ 
programme.  
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the asylum procedure. The definition of a refugee was narrowed and applicants 
passing through safe third countries were denied eligibility for a permanent protection 
visa. Other provisions included introducing harsher penalties for people-smuggling 
offences and limiting access to judicial review of asylum decisions. This package of 
measures represents a draconian toughening of policy that some observers criticised 
as in breach of the Refugee Convention.20  
 Events in the United States also influenced asylum policy.  Following the 9/11 
attacks, the USA PATRIOT Act introduced tougher measures against those with 
suspected links to terrorist organisations as well as dramatically increasing the number 
of border control agents. An Act of May 2002 further strengthened border controls by 
setting up an integrated database system for entry and exit linked to fingerprinting and 
biometric monitoring. Canada also tightened its border security and in an Act of 2001 
it introduced tougher measures including detention for asylum seekers without 
documents. The enhanced security measures in North America were followed, to 
varying degrees, by other countries as a result of heightened concerns about terrorism. 
  
Indicators of asylum policy, 1997 to 2006 
Policy evolved differently in the major developed countries receiving asylum 
applications. Some EU member states introduced reforms to bring their policies into 
line with new EU legislation. But for the most part policy reforms were country-
specific responses to political pressures and alleged deficiencies in the existing 
system. In order to evaluate their effects we need some index of policy. The most 
often cited measure of toughness in asylum policy is the recognition rate. As noted 
earlier, this is proportion of first instance decisions (excluding appeals) during the 
year that resulted in recognition under the Convention or in permission to stay on 
humanitarian grounds.  
As the left-hand panel of Table 4 shows, for the nineteen countries in 
aggregate the total recognition rate fell from more than a third in 1997-2001 to about a 
quarter in 2002-6, a substantial decline. However, there is wide variation in both 
levels and changes across the different countries listed in the table. The most dramatic 
declines in recognition rates came in the Netherlands with a fall of 43 percentage 
points and in Denmark where it fell by 35 percentage points, both exceeding the 19 
                                                 
20 For more detail on the Tampa incident and the events that followed it, see Hatton and Lim (2005) 
and Tazreiter (2005). 
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percentage point fall for the UK. As the table also shows, recognition rates in Poland 
increased a little between the two periods.  It is interesting to compare the change in 
recognition rates in Table 4 with the percentage change in asylum applications 
between 1997-02 and 2002-6 reported in Table 1. The correlation coefficient between 
these changes across the nineteen countries is –0.46, suggesting that tougher decisions 
on refugee status may have deterred asylum applications. However, recognition rates 
depend not just on the status determination procedure but also on the composition 
(and perhaps the volume) of applications. And while it is a central component of 
asylum policy it is not the only component.  
 To provide an alternative, more comprehensive, measure of policy stance I use 
published reports to identify ‘major’ changes in a variety of different dimensions of 
policy (see Appendix 2 for further details). While such an exercise is inevitably 
somewhat hazardous, an effort was made to ensure objectivity. The major changes 
that form the index are based almost entirely on legislation rather than on general 
impressions about the toughness of asylum policy. In addition they are based on 
contemporary accounts of the legislation rather than on ex post evaluations made in 
the light of the apparent results of policy. The fifteen components of the index are 
listed in Appendix 2, together with some interpretation of what constitutes a major 
change. Starting at zero at the in the first quarter of 1997, each of the components 
shifts up by one for significant toughening of policy and down by one for a policy 
change that is more generous to asylum seekers. It is important to stress that this is a 
crude measure of policy change that does not reflect differences across countries in 
the finer details of policy change or in its enforcement. Nor is it an absolute measure 
of toughness, but merely the difference in policy stance as compared with the 
beginning of 1997.    
 The right hand panel of Table 4 shows the overall policy stance for each 
country in the years 1997-2001 and 2002-6, summing over the 15 components of 
policy. The bottom line shows that the average policy stance toughened by 1.78 index 
points between the two periods. But again there is wide variation between countries. 
The index illustrates a dramatic toughening of policy across the decade in Australia 
and the UK followed by the Netherlands and Denmark. In most of the other countries 
policy became mildly more restrictive and in Sweden and Poland policy became, on 
balance, more favourable to asylum seekers. The correlation coefficient between 
changes in the policy index and the percentage fall in asylum applications (Table 1) is 
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–0.56, which is slightly higher than that between asylum applications and the 
recognition rates. The correlation of 0.48 between changes in recognition rates and in 
this broader index of policy is positive but not particularly strong.  
 The fifteen components of policy are divided into three groups, each 
consisting of five components. Those representing the ability of asylum seekers to 
gain access to the country’s territory are labelled ‘access’; those representing the 
toughness of the country’s refugee status determination procedure are labelled 
‘processing’; and those relating to the welfare of asylum seekers during and after 
processing are labelled ‘welfare’.  Figure 5 displays the evolution of the unweighted 
19-country average of these policy components. All three components show a 
progressive tightening of policy over the decade. As might have been expected, policy 
towards access and processing became especially restrictive between 2001 and 2005. 
Policy towards the welfare of asylum seekers also became tougher, but at a more even 
pace. 
 
Assessing the Destination Determinants of Asylum Applications.  
 
The evidence suggests that policy got tougher in the decade to 2006, despite the fact 
that many countries had already tightened their policy stances earlier in the 1990s. But 
did it deter asylum applications as governments have sometimes claimed and as the 
correlations noted above suggest? How far can differences in policy account for the 
widely varying trends in applications experienced over the last decade by different 
countries once other influences are taken into account? 
 
Existing econometric evidence  
A number of previous studies have examined the pattern of asylum 
applications from the perspective of receiving countries in Europe and elsewhere. 
These have focused on three questions. One is the role of conditions in destination 
countries as ‘pull factors’ in asylum migration, and in particular the role of labour 
market conditions. Since asylum seekers have sometimes been characterised as labour 
migrants in disguise, the goal has been to see if variables that are known to influence 
international migration also determine asylum flows. A second issue is whether 
policies that are aimed at reducing the volume of applications have had any effect. 
The experience up to the mid-1990s, when rising applications went hand in hand with 
 21
tougher policies, led many observers to question the deterrent effects of policy. And 
third, if policy does influence the volume of applications, would a convergence of 
policy stance across receiving countries lead to a more equitable sharing of the 
refugee burden? This question arose from discussions in the EU during the 1990s 
about ‘burden-sharing’ and the effects of policy harmonisation.21  
A number of methods have been used to identify the effects of policy and 
other variables on asylum flows. Studies based on interviews with asylum seekers find 
that their choice of destination is largely determined by the presence of friends and 
relatives, while asylum policies and labour market conditions are of secondary 
importance (Havinga and Böcker, 1999; Robinson and Segrott, 2002). Those that 
study cross-country correlations generally yield inverse relationships between changes 
in asylum applications and policy restrictiveness (Vink and Meijerink, 2003; 
Theilemann, 2004; Zetter at al., 2003). And a few studies have used time series 
analysis to examine the effects of major policy reforms in a single destination country. 
For Switzerland, Holzer et al. (2000) find that a dummy for the 1990 policy reform 
reduced applications, especially from the Lebanon and Sri Lanka, but the overall 
recognition rate had little effect. For Germany, Vogler and Rotte (2000) find strong 
positive effects on applications for political terror and source country GDP as well as 
a large negative effect for a dummy representing the 1993 policy reform. 
Several recent studies have applied multivariate analysis to panel data on 
destination countries. In one such study, Theilemann (2006) took as the dependent 
variable a destination country’s share of total applications adjusted by its share of 
population in order to net out source country effects. Using a panel of 20 destination 
countries for 1985-99 he found that a country’s unemployment rate negatively 
influenced its share of applications while its foreign-born stock had a positive effect. 
He also derived a policy index made up of five components, which provided some 
support for the deterrence effect of policy, although he found little effect for 
indicators of policy towards refugee integration as compared with those representing 
refugee status determination procedures. However, he did not disaggregate by country 
of origin and therefore did not allow for differences across destinations in the source 
country composition of asylum applications.      
                                                 
21 It arose in particular from a proposal made by Germany in 1992, that asylum applicants be 
redistributed among the countries of the EU using a formula based on income, population and area. 
This proposal was strongly opposed by the UK and, although it came to nothing, it served to intensify 
the debate about burden-sharing, which persisted throughout the 1990s.  
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Neumayer (2004) took shares for each destination of applicants from each 
origin as the dependent variable (thus also netting out origin country effects) and 
estimated over 1982-99. He found significant effects for the level and growth rate of 
GDP per capita in the destination, but not for unemployment. In the absence of the 
migrant stock, variables such as colonial links, common language and distance were 
all found to be significant in the expected direction (consistent the empirical evidence 
on migration). The only policy variable used was the overall recognition rate for the 
destination. This proved to be positive, suggesting that tougher status determination 
procedures act as a deterrent, but the effect on a country’s share of applications 
appears to be small. A ten-percentage point reduction in the recognition rate reduces a 
country’s share of applications by 0.2 percentage points. Neumayer also found that 
countries with right-wing populist governments had lower shares of asylum 
applications.  
In my earlier study (Hatton, 2004) I examined the level of applications to 14 
EU countries by three continents (Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe) for 1981-99, 
allowing for source effects by continent. Relative income, destination unemployment, 
the migrant stock and the cumulative stock of applications were all important 
influences. Among the source continent effects, political rights and an index of 
conflict proved to be the most important.  A composite index of asylum policy, 
similar to the one discussed above and based on eleven indicators, gave a significant 
negative coefficient.  This implies that the tightening of policy that occurred over the 
two decades to 1999 reduced asylum claims in the EU by about 150,000, or about 12 
percent of its mean level. A more detailed analysis of EU country shares by origin in 
the 1990s also supported the negative effect of policy but provided little evidence that 
tougher policies deflected asylum seekers from one destination country to another.   
To summarize, recent econometric studies find that destination country effects 
matter, particularly the migrant stock and either the change in GDP or the 
unemployment rate. They generally find negative policy effects, although these vary 
in magnitude, and they are often dominated by other variables—a finding that has led 
some observers to conclude that policy harmonisation would do little to equalise the 
refugee burden. Finally, few of the existing studies provide estimates of the amount 
by which policy reduced applications and none provides an estimate for any year after 
1999. Hence they cannot address the claims sometimes made by governments about 
effectiveness of policy in explaining the recent decline in asylum applications.  
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New Estimates for 1997-2006 
To shed further light on the issues raised by earlier studies, I examine a dataset 
of annual asylum applications by source country and by destination for the years 
1997-2007. This is taken, as before, from the UNHCR’s database. It includes the 
nineteen destination countries listed in Table 1 and forty source countries (listed in the 
Appendix 1). The forty source countries are a subset of those analysed previously, 
normally those for which there were significant flows to several destinations during 
the period. In cases where the bilateral flows were consistently small the figures are 
often not reported and these dyads were omitted, leaving 637 bilateral pairs out of a 
possible 760 (=19×40).22 Together these account for 80 percent of all applications to 
the nineteen destination countries. The dependent variable for the analysis is the log 
of the annual number of applications from a given source to a given destination over 
the years 1997 to 2006 (zero values were set to one before taking the log). 
 The explanatory variables include those source-country variables that were 
found to be important in explaining the flows of asylum applications in Table 2. These 
include the terror scale and the Freedom House index of political rights. Source 
country GDP per capita never proved to be significant and so it was dropped from the 
analysis. When examining bilateral flows it is important to take account of the fact 
that asylum seekers from different source countries are often concentrated on a few 
major destinations. As with all migration flows, this is the result of historic ties, such 
as colonial links, common language, cultural proximity, as well as physical distance 
from the source to the destination. These effects are captured in large part by the stock 
of previous migrants in the destination country. Here I use the total stock of foreign 
born from a given source at a given destination in 2000/1 as reported by the OECD 
(see Appendix 1). The vast bulk of these are ordinary migrants although the total also 
includes some successful asylum seekers in the years before 2000. As a measure of 
economic conditions at the destination I use the unemployment rate.  
In order to test the effects of policy I use the two indicators discussed 
previously. The first is the total recognition rate—the proportion of asylum decisions 
(for applicants from all sources) for a given destination country that resulted in 
acceptance. This is potentially endogenous since a lower recognition rate may deter 
                                                 
22 Dyads are omitted when less than ten cases are recorded over the whole decade. In cases where the 
dyad is included but the value for a particular year is missing, it is entered as 1.  
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applications that are least likely to result in recognition.23 Alternatively I use the 
indices of the three different dimensions of policy that were discussed in the previous 
section. It is worth reiterating that these are fairly crude indicators of what are often 
subtle and complex changes in the way that asylum systems work. A further policy-
related variable is a dummy for the years 2002-6 interacted with the percentage 
Muslim in the source country. Since the share Muslim takes a single value for each 
source country, in the presence of fixed source country effects, this variable measures 
the differential post-2001 effect for Muslims. The aim is to capture any difference in 
policy towards asylum seekers from Muslim countries in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, not just in asylum policy but also more generally.   
Table 5 reports specifications with different sets of fixed effects. The 
regression in the first column includes source country fixed effects as well as a 
dummy for each destination. Not surprisingly bilateral ties, as represented by the 
migrant stock in 2000/1, are very significant, with an elasticity of about one third. 
This is testimony to the power of the ‘friends and relatives effect’ that has so often 
been identified in empirical studies of migration. The destination unemployment rate 
(lagged one year) is strongly negative, supporting the view that labour market 
conditions do influence the number of asylum applications. In this case a one-
percentage point increase in unemployment would reduce asylum applications by 
about ten percent. Terror and political rights in source both take significant 
coefficients that are similar in magnitude to those in the previous analysis of 
aggregate flows from source countries. The coefficient on the total recognition rate is 
very small and insignificant, offering little support for the view that higher rejection 
rates have deterred asylum applications. On the other hand there were significantly 
fewer applications from Muslim countries from 2002 onwards, an effect which 
reduced the numbers coming from a country that was 100 percent Muslim by more 
than a quarter   
The second column of Table 5 shows what happens when fixed effects are 
included for each year in each source country. These dummies completely absorb 
source country effects, which may be too heterogeneous to be fully accounted for by 
the variables in column (1). The total recognition rate now becomes significant 
                                                 
23 Neumayer (2005b) finds that recognition rates depend on the lagged volume of asylum applications 
as well as on conflict and oppression in source countries. Following Neumayer (2004) I experimented 
with the recognition rate lagged one year. This always proved to be insignificant 
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although the explained variation rises only modestly. Column (3) uses a different set 
of fixed effects, this time a fixed effect for each source-destination pair. This absorbs 
the bilateral effects captured previously by the migrant stock. Again the results for the 
other variables are very similar to those in column (1). Once all the bilateral effects 
are absorbed the equation explains very little of the remaining variation, even though 
some of the coefficients remain highly significant.  
Finally I account for the endogeneity of the total recognition rate. Recall that 
the coefficient will be biased towards zero if a fall in the recognition rate deters those 
most likely to be rejected. Here I use as instruments for the recognition rate two of the 
components of the index of policy concerned with ‘processing’. These are policy 
towards manifestly unfounded claims and policy related to subsidiary status, both of 
which are closely related to recognition rate. The smaller the share of applications 
treated as manifestly unfounded and the greater the possibilities for granting some 
form of humanitarian status the higher should be the recognition rate.24 Using these 
instruments the coefficient on the recognition rate in column (4) now becomes 
positive and strongly significant, suggesting that previous studies that have used 
recognition rates as a measure of policy may have underestimated its true effect on 
applications. On this estimate, a fall in the recognition rate of ten percentage points 
reduces applications by sixteen percent.  
Table 6 introduces the indices for the three components of policy directly. In 
the simplest fixed effects model of column (1), the policy components representing 
both access and processing have strong negative effects whereas that reflecting 
welfare is not significant. The same result holds in columns (2) and (3) with different 
sets of fixed effects. Consistent with other studies, this suggests that the two key 
elements of deterrence are access to the country’s territory in order to establish a 
claim for asylum, and the toughness of the refugee status determination procedure. It 
is interesting that, in the presence of these policy variables, the Muslim effect 
disappears, suggesting that this may have been picking up the effect of access 
policies.  In column (4) the total recognition rate is substituted for the processing 
policy index, using the two subcomponents, for manifestly unfounded claims and 
                                                 
24 The F statistics in the first stage regression is 9.6, although the subsidiary status variable is highly 
significant. The Sargan test for overidentification gives χ2(1) = 0.9, indicating that these are valid 
instruments.    
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subsidiary status as instruments.25 The coefficient on access remains strongly 
significant and the other coefficients are little changed.  
These results indicate a strong deterrent effect, at least for some elements of 
policy. They fly in the face of those who suggest that policy has been ineffective. 
Importantly, they warn against relying solely on the refugee recognition rate as an 
index of policy without taking its endogeneity into account.  
 
The effects of policy on total applications 
What was the effect of policy on the overall total of asylum applications? We 
can explore these effects using the coefficients from column (3) of Table 6. On 
average, across the 19 destination countries, the effects of tightening access to 
territory reduced applications by 14 percent between 2001 and 2006, while tougher 
processing reduced applications by 17 percent. However this does not account for all 
the sources of applicants to each destination, and neither does it allow for the different 
weight of each destination in the total for all destinations. To estimate the overall 
impact of policy I use the coefficients on access and processing (ignoring the small 
and insignificant effect of welfare) to calculate the proportionate effect of policy 
change for each destination, using total applications as the base. This assumes that 
policy effects on applications from source countries that are excluded from the 
regressions are the same as for those that are included. I then convert the proportional 
effects predicted by policy for each destination country to absolute numbers by 
evaluating them at the mean of annual applications for that country over the decade 
1997-2006 (see note to Table 7).  
The first column of Table 7 shows the change in total asylum applications 
between 2001 and 2006 for each of the nineteen destinations countries. The second 
column is the predicted effect on the total as a result of the change in access policies 
over the same period, and the third column shows the predicted effect of processing 
policies. The last column shows the combined effect of the two policies, which differs 
from the sum of the individual policies because of the non-linearity of the underlying 
relationship. Thus, for example, the effect of tougher policies in Australia was to 
reduce annual asylum applications by 2654, over this period as compared with the 
actual decline in applications of 8856. In some countries no change is recorded in one 
                                                 
25 When both the processing index and the recognition rate (not instrumented) were included the latter 
was not significant (‘z’ = 0.9).    
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or (in the case of the Czech Republic) both branches of policy and hence it did not 
contribute to the significant falls in applications. While tougher policy ‘explains’ most 
of the decline in applications for France, it contributes only about a quarter of the 
decline in applications for Germany. For the both the UK and the US policy evidently 
accounts for more than a third of the fall in applications.  
For all nineteen countries combined, the effect of policy was to reduce 
applications by 108,000 per annum, or almost a third of the drop in applications 
between 2001 and 2006. For the nineteen-country total, Figure 6 displays the absolute 
deviation from the 1997 level of applications—rising by over 200,000 before falling 
to nearly 120,000 below the 1997 level. The lower lines show the effects of policy, 
starting from zero at the beginning of 1997. Over the decade, access and processing 
policies contributed about equally to the total policy effect. As is clear from the graph, 
policy contributes very little to the annual variation in applications, and it accounts for 
only one third of the fall between 2001 and 2006. On the other hand policy more than 
accounts for the decline in applications over the longer period from 1997 to 2006.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has outlined the evolution and characteristics of the rise and fall of asylum, 
drawing on recent studies and providing new estimates of the source country 
determinants of asylum flows and the effects of asylum policies in the developed 
world. The implications of the analysis can be summarised in three main points.  
• There is consistent evidence that the flow of asylum seekers to the West is 
determined by oppression and terror and also by poor economic conditions. 
These effects dominate those representing the underlying political structures. 
But they cannot explain the sharp increase in worldwide applications that 
occurred in the 1980s.  
• There is evidence that asylum policies have become tougher and that this has 
reduced the volume of asylum applications. This effect appears to be stronger 
than some previous studies have suggested and it accounts for all of the fall in 
applications since 1997. But policy explains only about a third of the steep 
decline between 2001 and 2006—a distinctly smaller effect than some 
politicians have claimed.  
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• The policies that deter applications are those that limit access to territory and 
those that reduce the proportion of claims that are successful. There seems to 
be no separate effect on applications from Muslim countries post-2001. 
Policies that diminish the socioeconomic conditions of asylum seekers 
evidently have little deterrent effect and they may even contribute to the 
subsequent deprivation that many asylum seekers experience. This suggests 
that the need to find a balance between punitive policies on living conditions 
and more positive refugee integration measures is less of a dilemma than is 
sometimes believed.    
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Appendix 1: Data Sources 
 
Asylum Seekers. 
The number of asylum applications by source country was obtained from the UNCR Statistical Online 
Population Database at: http://www.unhcr.org/statistics.html. The 56 countries that are represented in 
Table 2 and that underlie the regression analysis of Table 3 are as follows:  
 
Afghanistan* Colombia* Islamic Rep. of Iran* Romania* 
Albania* Dem. Rep. of Congo* Dem. Rep. Of Laos Russian Federation* 
Algeria* Cuba* Lebanon Serbia & Montenegro* 
Angola* Czech Rep. Liberia* Sierra Leone* 
Armenia* El Salvador* Macedonia* Slovakia 
Azerbajian* Ethiopia* Mali Somalia* 
Bangladesh* Georgia* Mauritania Sri Lanka* 
Bosnia & Herzegovina* Ghana Mexico* Sudan* 
Bulgaria* Guatemala* Moldova* Syrian Arab Rep.* 
Burundi Guinea* Nicaragua Togo 
Cambodia Haiti* Nigeria* Turkey* 
Cameroon* Hungary Pakistan* Uganda 
Chile India* Peru Ukraine* 
China* Iraq* Poland Viet Nam* 
 
The number of applications by source and by destination is taken from the same source. The 19 
destinations are those listed in Tables 1, 4 and 7 and the source countries are those marked by * in the 
table above. Total recognition rates for the 19 destination countries 1996-2006 are taken from the 
UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2005, Table C14 and 2006 Table 6.  
 
Index of Democracy/Autocracy 
Polity IV index of Political Authority at: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/about/ .  
The version used here is the revised combined polity score, which is a composite index based on five 
components reflecting institutionalised constraints on authority of the government executive, the 
competitiveness of the political system and the degree of public participation.  
 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties.  
Freedom House index at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls. The political 
rights index is based on scores relating to the electoral process, political pluralism and participation and 
the functioning of government. The civil liberties index is based on scores relating to freedom pf 
expression and belief, associational and organisational rights, the rule of law and personal autonomy 
and individual rights.  
 
Political Terror  
Political Terror Scale provided by Mark Gibney at: 
http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/DOCS/Gibney/Political%20Terror%20Scale%201980-2005.pdf  
This index  represents the scale of arbitrary imprisonment, torture, political murders and general 
violence. The series used here is the one based on reports of the US State Department. Missing values 
are filled in either by using the alternative series based on reports by Amnesty International or by 
interpolation or extrapolation. One advantage of the political terror scale is that it attempts to capture 
the average experience and in principle it is not influenced by the size of the country  
 
Battle Deaths in Civil Wars. 
The number of battle-related deaths is calculated from the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset at: 
http://new.prio.no/CSCW-Datasets/Data-on-Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths-Data2/Battle-Deaths-Data/. 
The measure was constructed using the ‘best’ estimate of deaths in all internal armed conflicts for each 
country year. International wars are excluded because they do not necessarily imply persecution of 
citizens by the state or a faction within the territory.  The data are available to 2005 and values for 2006 
were extrapolated. 
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GDP Per Capita 
GDP per capita in US$ at constant (2000) prices (chain series) from Penn World Tables 6.2 at: 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php.   Data for 1982-2004 extrapolated to 2006.  
 
Population 
Total population available from the World Bank at: 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats/query/default.html.  The share of population aged 20-39 (at five 
year intervals) is taken from the UN Population Prospects 2006 Revision at: 
http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp.  
 
Migrant Stock 
The number of foreign-born observed in each OECD country in 2000/1, broken down by country of 
birth is taken from the OECD database on immigrants and expatriates at: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/51/0,3343,en_2825_494553_34063091_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
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Appendix 2: An Index of Changes in Asylum Policies 
 
The asylum policy index discussed in the text was constructed from annual country reports on policy 
developments given in three sources. These are: the OECD’s annual publication International 
Migration Outlook (previously Trends in International Migration); the country reports of the European 
Council on Refugees and Exiles (at http://www.ecre.org/search/node/country+reports) and the country 
reports of the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (at 
http://www.refugees.org/worldmap.aspx). These sources were used to identify major changes in 
different of dimensions of asylum policy in order to create an index of policy change.  The index for 
each component starts at zero in the first quarter of 1997 and increases by 1 for a significant toughening 
of policy and decreases by 1 for a significant loosening. Thus it captures the direction of change in 
policy stance rather than representing the absolute level relative to other countries. As far as possible 
the shift is dated in the quarter following its introduction rather than at the time it was announced.   
The index is based on a subjective evaluation of announced policy changes as reported by 
country experts at the time that policy was changed. It is sometimes difficult from this information to 
assess whether a policy change is ‘major’ or not. The criterion used here is, firstly that the policy 
change is likely to affect a significant proportion of asylum seekers, and secondly, that it substantially 
alters access to asylum procedures, or the likelihood of a successful claim, or the material welfare of 
asylum seekers. Nevertheless this is a crude indicator of what are often subtle and complex changes in 
the way that asylum systems work and it takes no account of how the effectiveness of policy is 
influenced by changes in enforcement or administrative practices that do not catch the headlines.  
 The different components of the index and the typical changes that they involve are listed in 
the following table: 
 
Conditions relating to access to territory 
Visa Requirements Change in the stringency of visa requirements such as application from 
abroad, biometric passports, fingerprinting 
Border Controls Excision of territory; enhanced border patrols; turning back or deporting 
undocumented arrivals. 
Penalties for 
trafficking 
Significantly enhanced apprehension of traffickers; detention/deportation or 
imprisonment.  
Carrier liability Significant change in financial or other penalties for carriers by land, sea or 
air of undocumented arrivals.  
Offshore applications Change in the opportunity to apply for asylum from an embassy or consulate 
abroad rather than in-country.  
Conditions relating to the processing of applications and the determination of status 
Definition of a refugee Rules relating to the causes of persecution such as gender, persecution by 
non-state agents, internal flight alternative.  
Manifestly unfounded 
applications 
Changes in grounds for applying the presumption of ineligibility, such as 
‘safe country of origin’, ‘safe third country’, time elapsed since arrival or 
insufficient documentation.  
Speeding up of 
processing  
Typically reducing the maximum period for decisions, or a general decrease 
in processing times.   
Subsidiary status Changing scope for granting humanitarian status to those not qualifying 
under the Convention, or significant alteration to the terms of such status.  
Appeals Changes in access to appeals, changing number of levels of appeal, or 
altering the suspensive effect of appeals. 
Conditions relating to the welfare of asylum seekers 
Detention Changes in rules or practices on detention of applicants during processing or 
for those with failed claims 
Deportation Changes in the practices of deporting failed asylum seekers, including raising 
targets or widening the set of those eligible for deportation.  
Employment Changes in the right to seek employment while an asylum claim is being 
determined, or to the waiting time for permission to work.  
Access to benefit Shift from cash to in-kind benefit; access to benefit only at reception centres; 
dispersal to non-metropolitan reception centres.  
Family reunification Changes in the possibility of family reunification during or after processing 
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Supplementary Appendix: Country Notes on Changes in Asylum Policies 
 
What follows is a thumbnail sketch of policy developments in the countries of asylum that are covered 
in this study, covering the decade 1997-2006. Some countries introduced a wide range of measures in 
the early and mid-1990s (see Hatton, 2004), and so these are not detailed here. Some countries also 
introduced a variety of changes to their immigration policies, which are only mentioned where they 
have a substantial bearing on asylum.  
 
Australia 
In the late 1990s Australia took a number of measures to stem the rising flow of ‘onshore’ asylum 
applications. One step was the introduction of temporary protection visas for three years for those not 
granted Convention status, with no right of reentry or family reunion. But the most important policy 
shift occurred in November 2001 in the wake of the Tampa incident. The raft of legislation included: 
the excision of certain islands in the north from Australian territory for the purposes of claiming 
asylum; permanent protection denied to those who had spent at least 7 days in a safe country prior to 
arrival in Australia; narrowing the definition of a refugee to the minimum required by the Refugee 
Convention; harsher penalties for people smuggling; and limited access to judicial review of migration 
decisions.  
 
Austria 
The Aliens Act of 1992 introduced following the opening up of Central and Eastern Europe introduced 
a very tough safe third country rule that denied access to asylum procedures to those travelling through 
countries that had signed the Convention. Amendments enacted in 1997 (effective 1/1/98) weakened 
this rule for those transiting directly. It also introduced an accelerated procedure for manifestly 
unfounded claims, introduced a safe country of origin rule and established a Board of Appeals. The 
2003 Asylum Amendment Act (effective 1/5/04) reformed the system of appeals, removed their 
suspensive effect, and decentralized welfare provisions for asylum seekers in the ‘basic care 
agreement’ under which benefits became accessible in the first six months. The 2005 Asylum Act  
(effective 1/1/06) introduced a series of modifications aimed at streamlining the processing of 
applications in order to speed up process. At the same time the 2005 Alien Police Act extended the 
scope for detention (in cases of appeals or claims likely to be rejected) and increased the maximum 
period to ten months.  
 
Belgium 
A package of measures was introduced under the reform known as the Vande Lanotte Act of 1996, 
which covered the entry, residence, settlement and forced departure of foreigners, and dispersed asylum 
seekers to designated centres. A wide array of amendments to the 1996 Act were introduced in 1998, 
the most notable of which was the creation of a temporary asylum status that carried the right to work 
and to social benefit (codified by Royal Decree of July 2004). In 1999 the decision time for 
applications was reduced to one month; the Dublin Convention was implemented, deportation 
measures were reinforced; and cash benefit to asylum seekers was converted to in-kind provision 
(effective at the beginning of 2001). In 2004 the implementation of an EU Directive introduced more 
stringent sanctions for carriers facilitating the entry of foreigners without the appropriate documents (to 
return the individual or pay the costs of stay) (effective 12/04).  
 
Canada 
At the end of 1996 the Canadian government announced two new classes of humanitarian admissions, 
for those affected by civil war or armed conflict and for those for whom there is no realistic possibility 
of return (effective 1/5/97). Canada introduced stronger border security measures in the wake of the 
9/11 attacks in the US under the Public Safety Act of November 2001. The Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act of 2001 (effective 28/6/02) introduced faster pre-screening and replaced the three-year 
delay in granting landed status for those without documents with measures for detention of 
undocumented asylum seekers. Other developments were periodic changes in the list of origin 
countries eligible for humanitarian grants and an agreement with the US on safe countries of origin that 
took effect at the end of 2004. 
 
Czech Republic 
The former Czechoslovakia ratified the Refugee Convention in 1993 and passed a new law on refugees 
in 1996. In preparation for entry to the EU, the Czech Republic amended the rules in 1999 under an 
Asylum Law and an Aliens Law (both effective 1/1/2000). These amendments introduced a procedure 
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for manifestly unfounded claims (from 1/7/2000) and introduced a new humanitarian/tolerated status as 
well as significantly tightening visa requirements (including the obligation to apply from abroad). 
Financial assistance to those outside reception centres was introduced (1/2/ 2002) but was subsequently 
withdrawn (1/1/03). From February 2002 a further amendment to the Asylum Law banned asylum 
seekers from seeking work within one year. In July 2003 a law was passed to revising the 
administration of temporary protection and extending the right to family reunification. 
 
Denmark  
Major packages of measures were introduced in 1995 and 1996. An amendment to the Aliens Act 
(effective 3/6/98) raised the standard of proof for de facto status, and narrowed the scope for family 
reunification as well as widening the grounds for expulsion. In a further amendment to the Aliens Act 
(effective 1/7/02) the right to apply for asylum from outside the country was abolished (Denmark 
having been alone in allowing this possibility). At the same time de facto refugee status was replaced 
with a stricter concept, which does not carry the right to permanent residence. A number of other 
amendments were introduced concerning the administration of manifestly unfounded claims and 
appeals as well as provisions (applied to foreigners generally) on permanent residency, citizenship and 
family reunification. In 2003 several further measures came into effect. These include what are 
described as “motivational measures”:  detention without limit prior to removal (effective 1/5/03) and 
removal of cash benefits (later withdrawn); there were also reforms to arrangements in reception 
centres, including measures to promote integration.  
 
France 
The 1998 Asylum Act amended the pre-existing Pasqua and Debré laws to allow rejection on ‘safe 
country of origin’ grounds. It also introduced two new categories: ‘constitutional asylum’ for freedom 
activists and ‘territorial asylum’ for those whose freedom is threatened or are subject to inhuman or 
degrading treatment. New rules on asylum came into force on 1/1/04 including: one stop processing of 
asylum applications (within two months); territorial asylum was replaced by subsidiary protection, 
which provides a temporary permit for one year (renewable depending on conditions at the origin). The 
definition of a refugee was widened to include persecution by non-state agents, but narrowed for cases 
where there is the possibility of ‘internal asylum’ in the origin country. Another act introduced tougher 
visa requirements, penalties for trafficking (and increased and sanctions for employers of illegal 
immigrants). In June 2005 France formally adopted the safe country of origin concept that had been in 
use since the late 1990s.  
 
Germany 
Germany introduced a dramatic toughening of its asylum policy with the 1993 amendment to the Basic 
Law. The previous ban on employment was lifted (1/1/01) permitting asylum seekers to work after 12 
months. Border enforcement was significantly stepped up in 2002 following the 9/11 attacks. The wide 
ranging immigration reform put to the Bundestag in 2002 failed to gain assent but the subsequent 
agreement led to the Immigration Act of 2004 (effective 1/1/05) which expanded the definition of a 
refugee to include non-state and gender-based persecution.  
 
Hungary 
Hungary adopted the Refugee Convention in 1989. The asylum law that came into force in March 1998 
removed the pre-existing limitation on refugees from outside Europe. It introduced three statuses: 
Convention refugees; war refugees (eligible for temporary protection) and other ‘recognised refugees’ 
subject to persecution. It also introduced an expedited procedure for manifestly unfounded claims and 
it provided for immediate expulsion for those entering illegally. In 2000 the EU provided finds for 
strengthening the border guard and introducing computerized records. The 2001 Aliens Act altered the 
administration of temporary protection and toughened the policy on pre-expulsion detention. The 2001 
Asylum Act (effective 1/1/02) introduced administrative reorganization of asylum procedures. 
Amendments to the Asylum Act (effective 1/5/04) revoked the possibility of expulsion until the 
conclusion of the asylum procedure; it also reduced the number of processing stages from 4 to 2 in 
order to speed up the process; and it provided the possibility of access to work permits per after 1 year. 
 
Ireland 
Pre-existing practices were codified in the 1996 Refugee Act, but most of its provisions were not 
implemented. In 1998 a new administrative framework was established that included procedures to deal 
with manifestly unfounded claims (particularly under the safe third country rule adopted in 1997). In 
April 1999 hostel accommodation and vouchers were substituted for the standard welfare benefits 
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previously received by asylum seekers; and asylum seekers were given the right to seek employment 
after one year (from 27/7/99), but only for those arriving prior to July 1999. The 1999 Refugee Act 
(effective 2/11/00) introduced administrative reforms including the establishment of an appeals 
tribunal. The Immigration Act of 2003 introduced carrier liability and, along with certain other 
measures, it allowed the designation of ‘safe countries of origin’. Under another Act the eligibility for 
receiving welfare was further tightened.  
 
Italy 
Italian policy was governed by the Martelli Law of 1990. Tougher regulations on entry and residence 
were introduced in Framework Law 286 of 1998, which included among other things provisions for 
rapidly deporting illegal immigrants, turning them back or escorting them to the border. Under the 
National Asylum Programmme of 2001 asylum seekers were provided with accommodation at 
dispersed reception centres. Law 189 of 2002 (the Bossi-Fini Law) altered the administrative 
framework in order to speed up the processing of applications and to confine certain types of applicants 
and those with rejected claims to detention centres (although this Law entered into force in September 
2002 it was not implemented until 21/4/05). 
 
Netherlands 
At the end of 1997 administrative orders were put in place (effective 1/6/98) to tighten border controls 
(including tougher identity checks, pre-boarding checks and ‘behind border controls’) and to encourage 
voluntary returns. The Aliens Act (effective 2/4/01) replaced the existing three categories of asylum 
status with one, providing temporary residence permits only (with permanent residence after three 
years), and reduced the scope for appeals (by abolishing administrative review). A new Ministry of 
Immigration and Integration was established in 2002, committed to processing applications within 48 
hours. From February 2003 deportation efforts were stepped up and failed asylum seekers were 
detained prior to expulsion.  In 2003 and 2004 a number of minor amendments were made to the Aliens 
Act.  
 
Norway 
Asylum procedure was governed by the 1988 Aliens Law and the 1990 Aliens Decree. In 2000 Norway 
introduced administrative changes to the appeals system and in 2002, a new system of distributing 
refugees to different localities, as well as measures to encourage voluntary repatriation. In July 2003 
penalties were raised for smugglers, traffickers and those providing false documents. In early 2004 a 
fast-track processing system was introduced for asylum seekers from ‘safe countries of origin’ and cash 
benefits were withdrawn for those in reception centres (effective 1/1/04).  Deportation efforts were 
stepped up in 2004 and (non-compulsory) removal centres introduced in 2005.  
 
Poland 
Poland ratified the Convention in 1991. The Aliens Act that came into force in December 1997 
(replacing an Act of 1963) incorporated the basic rules governing refugees and asylum, to be consistent 
with the EU, including safe third country and safe country of origin rules.  Although a procedure for 
manifestly unfounded claims existed in the 1997 legislation it was not implemented until an 
amendment to the Aliens Act (effective April 2001) introduced the concept of ‘evidently groundless’ 
asylum applications. The amendment also introduced new rights of appeal against decisions under both 
normal and expedited procedures. A new visa regime was implemented (1/10/03) in advance of 
Poland’s accession to the EU. The Act on the Protection of Aliens (effective 1/9/03) introduced a 
tolerated status for asylum seekers who could not return to their country of origin and this carries the 
right to work. The Aliens Act of 2004 gave asylum seekers the right to work after one year and 
extended the period for welfare assistance to asylum seekers (effective 6/05). 
 
Spain 
An Act of 1994 extended the right to asylum consistent with the Refugee Convention, speeded up 
processing and provided for the expulsion of unsuccessful asylum seekers. A 2000 Act (effective 
6/2001) tightened border controls including tightening of visa regulation and immediate expulsion of 
illegal immigrants. A Royal Decree of 2003 (effective 7/2/04) provided asylum seekers qualifying for 
humanitarian protection the right to stay and a Decree of 30th December 2004 gave the right to a work 
permit six months after application. In 2004-5 further efforts were made to strengthen land and sea-
based border controls with increase border patrols, cooperation with source countries and a new 
external surveillance system.  
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Sweden 
As of 1/1/97 an amendment to the Aliens Act provided the possibility of recognition to asylum seekers 
from ‘safe countries of origin’ but restricted recognition for war resisters and on the basis of gender and 
non-state persecution. The Aliens Act (effective 31/3/06) made asylum procedures more transparent 
and reformed the appeals system; those facing expulsion from November 2005 were granted 
humanitarian protection.  
 
Switzerland 
A law of June 1999 created the status of war refugee, giving the right to temporary protection but also 
placed more stringent eligibility requirements on undocumented asylum seekers. An increase from 
three to 12 months in the in the waiting period for permission to work imposed in September 1999, was 
lifted a year later (1/9/00). While proposals for reforms to the Asylum Law and the Law on Aliens were 
under review, measures introduced in 2003 included an accelerated procedure and pre-removal 
detention for those rejected under this procedure, and also reduced rights of appeal for claims deemed 
‘inadmissible’. A decision to deny failed asylum seekers the right to welfare assistance in April 2004 
was revoked in March 2005.  
 
UK 
Following restrictive legislation in 1993 and 1996, the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act introduced 
significantly shortened the appeals process (effective 2/10/2000) dispersed asylum seekers to provincial 
reception centres and substituted vouchers for cash benefits (from 1/4/2000), under the administration 
of the newly established National Asylum Support Service. The 2002 Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act introduced a number of measures to combat illegal entry and trafficking. It also replaced 
the category of ‘exceptional leave to remain’ with humanitarian protection which is only available to 
those unable to return to their origin country. It also abolished the right to work six months after 
application, stepped up border controls and further increased the penalties for carriers of illegal 
immigrants.  
 
USA 
The new measures introduced in the United States relate to border security and visa controls in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks. The USA PATRIOT Act, passed in November 2001 authorised a tripling in 
the number of patrol agents, inspectors and customs agents along the Canadian Border as well as 
tightening the student visa programme.  The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act (effective 
14/5/02) further enhanced border controls, setting up an integrated database system for entry and exit 
linked to biometric monitoring.  (It also required that countries in the visa waiver programme issue 
biometric passports by October 2004.)  
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Table 1: Asylum Applications by Destination Country, 1987-91 to 2002-06 
 
 Applications per annum % Change 
1997-01-
2002-06 1987-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 2002-2006 
Australia  7381 10470 4015 -61.7
Austria 19835 7795 17807 26432 48.4
Belgium 9460 16547 27355 15730 -42.5
Canada 35003 26448 30821 28176 -8.6
Czech Republic  1553 8059 6504 -19.3
Denmark 4377 9176 10301 3615 -64.9
France 45128 24044 33547 51541 53.6
Germany 146189 226461 92992 41448 -55.4
Hungary  283 7232 2826 -60.9
Ireland  419 6639 6587 -0.8
Italy  2376 14305 11770 -17.7
Netherlands 15534 31949 39773 13734 -65.5
Norway 5636 4946 11086 10421 -6.0
Poland  1213 3796 6248 64.6
Spain 5571 9345 7490 5665 -24.4
Sweden 24963 31008 14911 25875 73.5
Switzerland 25906 18771 29919 16356 -45.3
UK 27994 38900 76340 52488 -31.2
US 63694 129571 44223 35913 -18.8
Total   588186 487066 365345 -25.0
   
Source: For 1987 to 1996, UHCR Statistical Yearbook, 2001, Annexes C1 and C2; for 1997 to 2006: 
UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, 2005 and UNHCR Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized 
Countries, 2006. 
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Table 2: Conditions in 48/56 Origin Countries, 1982-2006 
 
 1982-86 1987-91 1992-96 1997-01 2002-06 
(1) Democracy 
     (scale –10 to 10) 
-4.48 -2.49 0.53
(0.98)
1.31 
(1.65) 
2.21
(2.48)
(2) Political rights 
     (scale 1 to 7) 
2.45 2.80 3.07
(3.19)
3.40 
(3.54) 
3.62
(3.74)
(3) Civil liberties 
     (scale 1 to 7) 
2.54 2.85 3.03
(3.13)
3.27 
(3.40) 
3.79
(3.90)
(4) War deaths 
     (per 1000 popn.) 
0.299 0.167 0.057
(0.124)
0.049 
(0.041) 
0.014
(0.012)
(5) Political terror 
     (scale 1 to 5) 
3.14 3.35  3.51
(3.39)
3.35 
(3.21) 
3.35
(3.21)
(6) GDP per capita 
     (thousand $US) 
3.40 3.39 3.23
(3.34)
3.59 
(3.70) 
3.99
(4.18)
(7) Population  
     (millions) 
60.66 66.75 72.82
(63.89)
78.51 
(68.73) 
83.81
(73.24)
(8) % of population 
     aged 20-39 
27.39 28.08 28.48
(28.95)
28.89 
(29.17) 
29.22
(29.22)
 
Sources: See Appendix 1. 
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Table 3: The Source Country Determinants of Asylum Applications, 1982-2006 
(dependent variable: log asylum applications per thousand population) 
 
 (1) 
RE
(2) 
RE
(3) 
FE
(4) 
FE
Constant 
 
0.015
(0.1)
-2.189
(3.5)
-2.061
(2.9)
-2.278
(3.4)
GDP per capita 
 
-0.144
(2.3)
-0.134
(2.3)
-0.250
(2.5)
-0.268
(2.8)
Democracy  
 
0.079
(2.6)
0.056
(1.9)
0.036
(1.1)
War deaths 
 
0.403
(2.3)
0.161
(0.9)
0.002
(0.0)
Political rights 
 
-0.441
(4.8)
-0.296
(3.1)
0.224
(2.3)
0.148
(2.1)
Terror scale 
 
0.504
(4.4)
0.667
(5.3)
0.689
(5.9)
Europe 
 
1.988
(4.5)
2.342
(5.2)
1982-86 
 
-1.958
(7.5)
-1.785
(7.0)
-1.749
(6.6)
-1.881
(8.6)
1987-91 
 
-0.012
(0.1)
0.016
(0.1)
0.013
(0.0)
-0.079
(0.4)
1992-96 
 
-0.111
(0.5)
-0.142
(0.7)
-0.190
(1.0)
-0.198
(1.0)
2002-06 -0.179
(0.8)
-0.205
(1.0)
-0.152
(0.8)
-0.129
(0.7)
R2  Within 0.41 0.49 0.50 0.49
      Between 0.29 0.20
      Overall 0.34 0.32
Hausman test 13.7 19.2
No of Obs 264 264 264 264
 
Note: ‘z’ statistics in parentheses.  
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Table 4: Asylum Recognition Rates and Policy Stance 1997-2001 and 2002-06 
 
Receiving country 
 
Recognition Rate Asylum Policy Index 
1997-02 2002-06 % point 
change 
1997-02 
 
2002-06 Change 
Australia 21.8 13.7 -8.1 1.05 7 5.95
Austria 22.0 40.0 18.0 -0.1 0.4 0.5
Belgium 34.9 27.5 -7.4 1.1 3.4 2.3
Canada 56.4 51.3 -5.1 -0.9 0.25 1.15
Czech Republic 5.7 5.3 -0.4 0.65 1.25 0.6
Denmark 54.7 19.8 -34.9 1.8 4.4 2.6
France 18.0 15.2 -2.7 0 2.4 2.4
Germany 17.4 6.7 -10.7 0.7 1.35 0.65
Hungary 25.3 34.7 9.4 0.2 1.9 1.7
Ireland 16.7 9.9 -6.8 0.95 2.35 1.4
Italy 30.1 32.5 2.4 0.4 0.65 0.25
Netherlands 75.1 32.1 -43.0 1 4.7 3.7
Norway 37.3 39.8 2.54 0 2.2 2.2
Poland 7.2 32.8 25.6 0 -1 -1
Spain 30.8 16.4 -14.4 0.45 2.05 1.6
Sweden 44.4 21.9 -22.5 0 -0.2 -0.2
Switzerland 39.3 32.4 -6.9 0.2 1.5 1.3
UK 41.8 22.6 -19.2 0.5 5.3 4.8
US 33.5 32.1 -1.4 0 1.9 1.9
Mean 35.0 25.4 -9.5 0.42 2.20 1.78
 
Sources: Recognition rates from UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2005 Table C14 and 2006 Table 6. for 
further details of the asylum policy index, see text and Appendix 2.  
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Table 5: Asylum Applications and Recognition Rates, 1997-2006 
(Dependent variable: log asylum applications from source to destination) 
 
 (1) 
FE
(2) 
FE
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE-IV
Constant 
 
1.194
(5.7)
1.090
(7.7)
5.167 
(31.3) 
5.037
(38.3)
Log migrant stock 
 
0.327
(32.3)
0.327
(33.2)
 
Total recognition rate  
 
0.002
(1.3)
0.003
(2.3)
0.002 
(1.8) 
0.016
(6.7)
Terror scale 
 
0.227
(7.2)
0.227 
(9.9) 
0.220
(9.3)
Political rights 
 
-0.127
(4.5)
-0.124 
(6.1) 
-0.126
(6.0)
Share Muslim * 2002-
6 dummy  
-0.317
(5.6)
-0.315 
(7.7) 
-0.214
(4.8)
Unemployment rate at 
destination (t-1) 
-0.105
(9.1)
-0.043
(3.5)
-0.105 
(12.5) 
-0.147
(13.7)
Fixed effects 
(number of FE) 
Source
(40)
Source*Year
(400)
Source*Dest 
(637) 
Source*Dest
(637)
Destination dummies Yes Yes No No
R2  Within 0.46 0.48 0.06 0.02
No of Obs 6339 6339 6339 6339
 
Note: there are 637 country pairs in the dataset but 31 observations involving Italy in 2006 are missing. 
Hence the total number of observations is 6370-31 = 6339. ‘z’ statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Asylum Applications and Policy, 1997-2006 
(Dependent variable: log asylum applications from source to destination) 
 
 (1) 
FE
(2) 
FE
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE-IV
Constant 
 
1.774
(8.2)
1.662
(10.4)
5.415 
(42.5) 
5.269
(40.1)
Log migrant stock 
 
0.327
(32.6)
0.327
(33.4)
 
Total recognition rate   0.012
(5.1)
Access -0.169
(5.3)
-0.183
(5.1)
-0.170 
(7.4) 
-0.214
(9.4)
Processing -0.197
(6.7)
-0.163
(5.3)
-0.198 
(9.3) 
Welfare 0.032
(0.9)
-0.125
(0.3)
0.031 
(1.2) 
Terror scale 
 
0.202
(6.4)
0.202 
(9.0) 
0.207
(8.4)
Political rights 
 
-0.115
(4.1)
-0.113 
(5.6) 
-0.119
(5.8)
Share Muslim * 2002-
6 dummy  
-0.039
(0.6)
-0.036 
(0.8) 
-0.054
(1.1)
Unemployment rate at 
destination (t-1) 
-0.116
(10.3)
-0.048
(3.9)
-0.113 
(14.3) 
-0.150
(14.2)
Fixed effects 
(number of FE) 
Source
(40)
Source*Year
(400)
Source*Dest 
(637) 
Source*Dest
(637)
Destination dummies Yes Yes No No
R2  Within 0.47 0.48 0.10 0.05
No of Obs 6339 6339 6339 6339
 
Note: there are 637 country pairs in the dataset but 31 observations involving Italy in 2006 are missing. 
Hence the total number of observations is 6370-31 = 6339. ‘z statistics are in parentheses.  
 
 44
Table 7: The Effects of Policy in on Asylum Applications 
 
Country Change in 
Applications  
2001-6 
Effect of 
Access 
Policies 
Effect of 
Processing 
Policies 
Effect of All 
Policies 
 
Australia -8856 -1685 -1263 -2654 
Austria -16785 0 -4989 -4989 
Belgium -12959 -3486 0 -3486 
Canada -21128 0 -6653 -6653 
Czech Republic -15074 0 0 0 
Denmark -10592 -1126 -835 -1826 
France -23601 -12654 -9596 -19395 
Germany -67257 -10876 -8064 -17636 
Hungary -7444 0 -603 -603 
Ireland -6015 -1070 -793 -1735 
Italy 492 0 -1564 -1564 
Netherlands -18109 0 -4667 -4667 
Norway -9462 -1740 -1290 -2821 
Poland -309 -813 685 -239 
Spain -4179 -1530 897 -842 
Sweden 805 0 2780 2780 
Switzerland -10093 0 -5219 -5219 
UK -63750 -19158 -7728 -24588 
USA -33823 -11917 0 -11917 
Total -328139 -66054 -48904 -108054 
 
Note: changes in policy are converted to changes in applications using the following formula: 
]1))([exp( 20012006 −−×= ppyy βΔ , where Δy is the predicted change in applications, y is the mean of 
applications for 1997 to 2006, β is the coefficient estimated in col. 3 of Table 4, and p is the policy 
index for a particular year.  
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Figure 1a: Asylum Applications by Destination, 1980-2006
North America
European Union - 15
Other Europe
Pacific
 
Sources: 1980-1: UNHCR, “Asylum Applications in Industrialized Countries: 1980-1999,” Table V.1, 
V.2; 1982-2005: UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks, 2001 and 2005, Table C1; 2006: UNHCR, “Asylum 
Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries, 2006,” Table 1.   
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Figure 1b: Asylum Applications by Origin Region, 1980-2006
Africa
Asia
Europe
Latin America
& Caribbean
Other/Unknown
 
Sources: 1980-1: 1980-1: UNHCR, Asylum Applications in Industrialized Countries Table V.4, V.5; 
1982-2005:UNHCR Statistical Yearbook  2001 and 2005, Tables C2; 2006: UNHCR, “Asylum Levels 
and Trends in Industrialized Countries, 2006,” Table 1. 
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Figure 2: Asylum Applications from Five Source Countries, 1982-
2006
Afghanistan
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Lebanon
Serbia & Montenegro
 
Source: See Appendix 1.  
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Figure 3: Refugees by Region of Asylum, 1970-2006
Africa
Asia
Europe
Latin America & Caribbean
North America
Other
 
Source: 1970-1999: UNHCR (2001), The State of the World’s Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian 
Action, Annex 3; 2000-2006: UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, 2005, Table A5, UNHCR Statistical 
Yearbook, 2006, Table 20.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47
-
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
600 
700 
800 
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002
Th
ou
sa
nd
s
Year
Figure 4: The Determination of Asylum Claims, 1982-2006
Convention
Humanitarian
Rejected
 
Source: 1982-2004: UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2001 and 2004, Annex C29; 2005-6: UNHCR 
Statistical Yearbook 2006, Tables C8-C10.   
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Figure 5: Components of Asylum Policy in 19 Countries, 1997-2006
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Source: See Appendix 2. 
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Figure 6: Asylum Applications and the Effects of Policy,  1997-2006
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
